The	Relational	Conception	of	Practical	Authority N.	P.	Adams In this	article I	articulate	a	new	conception	of	practical	authority	based	on	an	analysis	of the	relationship	between	authorities	and	subjects.	When	one	person	issues	a	command	to another, a certain kind of relationship obtains and the commander signals that this relationship	is	appropriate.	Most	importantly,	commands	demand	practical	deference	from subjects,	so	issuing	a	command	to	another	person	signals	that	such	a	demand	for	deference is	justified.	We	usually	do	not	stand	in	a	relationship	of	deference	to	other	people,	let	alone in	a	relationship	where	deference	can	be	unilaterally	demanded.	Analyzing	the	conditions under	which	such	an	unusual	relationship	is	justified	illuminates	the	conditions	for	genuine (or	legitimate,	or	justified,	or	de	jure)	practical	authority.1 My analysis results in four conditions: the duty, precedence, acceptance, and trustworthiness	conditions,	which	together	constitute	the	relational	conception	of	practical authority.	The	conditions	put	constraints	on	both	parties	in	an	authority	relationship;	if	and only	if	the	conditions	are	jointly	met	can	one	person	have	genuine	practical	authority	over another	person.	The	primary	virtue	of	the	relational	analysis	is	that	it	frames	the	question of authority not simply in terms of the conditions on rational deference but in terms of when	it	is	appropriate	for	both	parties	to	enter	a	certain	kind	of	relationship.	The	standing to	issue	commands	needs	justification	as	much	as	the	position	of	deference	does. This emphasis on the authority herself grounds the	most distinctive parts of the relational conception; in other respects, it builds on Joseph Raz's influential service conception.2	The	uniquely	relational	elements	of	my	analysis	add important	depth to	our understanding of authority.3 Raz and much of the literature that follows him frame authority	through	the	perspective	of	the	subject,	focusing	on	whether	obeying	an	authority 1 I prefer 'genuine' because, first, it is an open question how an institution's legitimacy depends on its possession	of	authority	qua	Hohfeldian	power.	Calling	genuine	authority	"legitimate"	obscures	this	question, particularly	in	the	political	context.	On	this	distinction,	see	N.	P.	Adams,	"Institutional	Legitimacy,"	The	Journal of Political Philosophy (forthcoming); Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 4; Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University	Press,	2012),	ch.	6.	Second,	understanding	authority	as	a	normative	power	means	that	one	either has	authority	or	one	does	not;	"unjustified"	possession	of	the	power	is	incoherent.	A	claim	to	authority	can	be justified	or	not,	but claiming is	distinct from	possessing.	Third, 'de jure' conjures legal	authority rather too closely	for	my	broader	concerns. 2	Joseph	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986). 3	Others	have	pursued	relational-in	some	sense-analyses	of	authority.	Most	prominently:	Stephen	Darwall, "Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting," in Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in SecondPersonal Ethics I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): pp. 135-150. Darwall's analysis is part of his broader	theory	of	normative	ethics	and	so	requires	many	contested	theoretical	commitments.	My	approach	is intentionally ecumenical to a	wide range of comprehensive	moral theories. Scott Hershovitz, "The Role of Authority,"	Philosopher's	Imprint	11	(2011):	pp.	1-19	incorporates	relations	in	yet	another	manner. 2 can be rational or consistent with autonomy.4 Answering these difficult questions is important for our understanding of authority. But authority, as I will argue, is robustly relational and focusing on only one party in the relationship leaves us	with a one-sided understanding of authority, which in turn generates an inappropriately limited set of normative	conditions	on	authority.	Authority	is	about	whether	one	person	has	the	standing to demand deference from another, not just about when deference is rational or autonomous. Here	is	the	plan.	In	the	first	section	I	characterize	the	concept	of	authority,	following Raz's rationalist	approach. In	section two I	undertake the	relational	analysis. In the third section	I	argue	for	four	conditions	on	genuine	authority	that	can	make	sense	of	the	claims intrinsic to the	authority relationship	articulated in section two.	Finally, in section four I compare	the	relational	conception	to	the	service	conception	and	apply	it	to	institutions. I.	Authority In the sense I am concerned	with, authority is a	Hohfeldian	normative	power.5 Someone with authority can change the elements of another person's normative standing (the collection of her Hohfeldian advantages and disadvantages) simply by expressing her intent that those	elements	change.6	We	all	have the	power to	change	our	own	normative standing	in	important	and	decisive	ways.	You	have	a	standing	claim-right	not	to	be	struck but can	waive that right and thereby	waive	others' correlative	duty	not to strike you, as boxers	do	in	a	boxing	match.	Authority is	akin	to	having	this	power	of	self-determination over	someone	else. Authorities	determine	how	others	may	act	and	how	they	may	be	acted	upon; they drastically	shape	the	position	of	a	person	in	their	community	and	their	relationships.	This is	a	surprising	power	to	have	over	someone	else,	to	put	it	mildly.	Authority	is	prima	facie seriously	objectionable	in	significant	part	because	it involves	having	control	over	another person's	normative	standing	in	a	way	that	our	autonomy	rights	usually	protect	against. Authority is exercised by issuing commands, which importantly require mutual recognition in order to succeed. (Here I use 'command' in the somewhat technical sense that	identifies	exercises	of	authority	and	so	has	the	characteristics	identified	below,	rather 4 See Scott Shapiro, "Authority," in Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar	Himma, and Scott J. Shapiro (ed.),	The Oxford	Handbook	of	Jurisprudence	and	Philosophy	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	UP,	2002):	pp.	382-438. 5	Wesley Newcomb	Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning (New	Haven: Yale	University	Press,	1919). 6	On	authority as a	Hohfeldian	power, see	Raz,	The	Morality of Freedom; Leslie	Green,	The	Authority of the State	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1988);	Stephen	Perry,	"Political	Authority	and	Political	Obligation,"	in	Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (ed.),	Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law	Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013):	pp.	1-74.	Other	senses	of	authority,	which	I	am	not	concerned	with	here,	include	authorized	force	and the	bindingness	of	reasons	generally. 3 than in the broader sense of any kind of directive.) Commands involve the particular reflexive intention that is distinctive of certain kinds of illocutionary acts: the speaker accomplishes a particular act by expressing her intent to accomplish that act to the recipient	and intending that the	act	be	accomplished	by the	recipient's	recognition	of the speaker's	intention.7	I	could	impose	a	duty	to	stop	on	you	in	a	variety	of	ways,	for	example by	stepping	into	a	crosswalk.	When	I	command	you	to	stop,	for	example	as	a	traffic	cop,	I express	my	intention	to	change	your	normative	standing	by	imposing	a	duty	to	stop.	If	you accept	my authority, you treat	my intention as successful so you take yourself to have a duty	to	stop	(and,	under	favorable	conditions,	therefore	also	form	an	intention	to	stop	and stop). If	you	treat	my	utterance	as	a joke	or	a	request, it fails	as	a	command	because	you don't	recognize	my	intention	to	bind	you. Commands	(of	genuine	authorities)	change	normative	standing,	which	in	general	is determined	by	the	balance	of	reasons.	For	example,	ceteris	paribus	the	weighty	reasons	of others'	rights	and	our	reasons	to	avoid	causing	suffering	defeat	the	reasons	we	might	have to	strike	someone,	so	we	have	a	duty	not	to	strike	them.	Changes	in	our	normative	standing are the	result	of	changes in	our	reasons, so the	power to	change	another's	standing	with commands	must be the result of some capacity to change their reasons in a unique and drastic	manner.	This is the	basis for	Raz's rationalist	approach to	authority, according to which	commands	constitute	preemptive	and	content-independent	practical	reasons. Commands constitute preemptive reasons because commands don't simply add another consideration to the balance of reasons, commands determine how the balance will go.8 This contrasts with the normal way we give others reasons, for example by request.	Your	boss' command to	attend	a	meeting is	very	different from	your	coworker's request.	Your	coworker's request	gives	you	a	reason to	attend the	meeting	but	may	very well be outweighed by your need to do other work. Your boss' command, on the other hand, preempts the other (employment-related) reasons you have and gives you an (employment)	obligation	to	attend	the	meeting,	even	if	you	are	very	busy.	The	commands of	authorities	preempt	other	reasons	instead	of	being	weighed	against	them,	so	determine normative	standing.	Preemption	captures	the	sense	in	which	commands	bind	subjects. Commands	constitute	content-independent	reasons	because	the	force	of	a	command comes	from	qualities	of	the	commander,	not	from	qualities	of	the	content	of	the	command.9 When	a	parent	exercises	her	parental	authority	and	commands	her	child	to	go	to	bed,	the child	may	ask	why they	should	obey.	A	paradigmatic response is "Because I told	you to." The	parent	avoids	explaining	the	merits	of	a	good	night's	sleep,	instead	appealing	directly 7	J.	L.	Austin,	How	to	Do	Things	with	Words	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1955);	P.	F.	Strawson,	"Intention and	Convention	in	Speech	Acts,"	The	Philosophical	Review	73	(1964):	pp.	439-460. 8	This	needs	various	qualifications,	e.g.	commands	from	authorities	only	bind	within	their	jurisdiction,	so	may not	determine	the	balance	of	a	subject's	reasons	all	things	considered. 9	N.	P.	Adams,	"In	Defense	of	Content-Independence,"	Legal	Theory	(forthcoming). 4 to	her	standing	as	a	sufficient	reason	for	obedience.	A	stranger	who	issued	a	command	with the	same	content	would	not	bind	the	child	to	go	to	bed	because	the	stranger	doesn't	stand in the	appropriate relationship to the	child.	An	appeal to the	qualities	of the	commander rather	than	the	merits	of	the	command	is	essential	to	authority:	if	subjects	only	acted	when they	judged	the	content	of	a	command	to	be	of	high	quality,	then	authority	loses	its	value	as a	practice	and	its	place	in	our	social	world.	The	whole	idea	is	that the	command	replaces the	subject's	individual	judgment.10 When we combine the insight that commands are illocutionary speech acts with preemption	and	content-independence,	we	get	the	following	picture:	authorities	have	the power to determine subjects' standing, regardless of subjects' other (in-jurisdiction) reasons,	just	because	the	authority	said	so,	simply	by	conveying	the	intention	to	effect	such a change. The question for any account of authority is how one person could have such dramatic	and	unusual	control	over	another. II.	The	Relational	Analysis In this section I analyze the relationship that obtains between two persons when one claims	authority	over	another.	I	borrow	my	general	methodology	from	some	contemporary epistemology of testimony.11 On these accounts, testimony involves the particular relational	act	of	telling	to:	a	hearer's	reasons	to	believe	that	p	on	the	basis	of	testimony	that p	are	distinct	from	reasons	based	on	a	mere	assertion	that	p.	Testifying	involves	presenting an assertion as responding to another person's epistemic needs and putting one's reputation	behind	the	assertion.	But	we	rarely	explicitly	state	that	we	are	responding	to	an epistemic	need	or that	we	stand	behind	our	assertion. Instead	we find these	elements	of testimony	in	the	signals	and	implicit	claims	that	structure	the	testimonial	relationship.12	As Edward Hinchman writes, "We cannot understand the nature of telling without understanding	how	it	functions	in	the	real	world	of	human	relations."13 My telling you that p signals that I am	meeting your epistemic needs because it would	violate	various	implicit	norms	of	interpretive	charity	and	conversational	implicature 10	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	pp.	58ff. 11 See Edward S. Hinchman, "Telling as Inviting to Trust," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): pp. 562-587; Paul Faulkner, "On Telling and Trusting,"	Mind 116 (2007): pp. 875-902; Miranda Fricker, "Group	Testimony?	The	Making	of	A	Collective	Good Informant,"	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research 84 (2012): pp. 249-276. To be clear, the relational conception of authority does not depend on accepting	assurance	views	of	testimony.	Further,	my	account	is	not	intended	to	capture	theoretical	authority. While	I	am	open	to	that	possibility,	it	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article,	especially	because	issues	of	duty, vulnerability,	and	autonomy	are	different	in	the	epistemic	context. 12	For	a	similar	analysis	of	promising,	relying	on	implicit	claims	and	signals,	see	T.	M.	Scanlon,	What	We	Owe to	Each	Other	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1998),	pp.	306-7. 13	Hinchman,	p.	564. 5 for	me	to	utter	p	in	a	social	condition	where	you	require	information	without	my	utterance being intended	to	meet	your	need. If I	uttered	p	as	a joke,	or	simply	as	stating	a	random fact, it	would	be inappropriate. Since	my	utterance is directed at you in the face	of your need	without	mitigating	presentation like laughter, I	am	appropriately taken	as	signaling that this information responds to your need. I similarly signal my assurance that the information is	accurate	because I	do	not	qualify	my	assertion, for	example	by	stating	my own	doubts	about the information.	The	nature	of testimony is revealed	by looking	at the signals	and	implicit	claims	that	any	act	of	telling	to	involves. Just	as testimony is	a relational	act	of telling to, commanding is	a relational	act	of demanding practical deference from.14 If	we	only look at the conditions	under	which it is rational to defer, or when deference is consistent with autonomy, we miss something important	about	authority.	It is	often	rational	to	defer	to	a	person	who	does	not	have	the standing to	demand	deference from	us.	Thus looking	at the relationship itself informs	us about	the	nature	of	authority	in	a	way	that	asking	only	about	responding	to	reasons	in	the abstract	does	not.	The	task	of	this	section	is	to	unpack	the	actual	act	of	demanding	another person	defer	to	you. The	first	question	is	what	it	means	to	defer	in	this	context.	Deferring	clearly	involves doing what was demanded, but this is not quite enough. Due to their illocutionary and content-independent	character,	commands	are	not	just	directives	to	act	in	some	way;	they are directives to act in some way because the commander said so. When one person exercises	practical	authority	over	another,	they	demand	deference	not	to	the	command	but to the commander. This is not deference to a good source of information or an abstract reason,	but	the	relational	deference	of	one	person	to	another. In this section I identify and discuss four salient points of interest to more fully characterize	this	sort	of	relationship.	First,	an	authority's	demand	for	deference	is	made	on the basis of the subject's reasons. Second, any relationship of deference is hierarchical. Third, when a subject defers to an authority she makes herself vulnerable. Fourth, demanding	deference	signals	that	the	deference	is	appropriate.	For	the	sake	of	discussion	I separate	these	out	conceptually,	but	they	are	interwoven	in	a	variety	of	important	ways. A.	Reasons First, authority is exercised	within the space of reasons: commanding someone to act is clearly not identical to physically forcing them to act or threatening them. Instead, commands	claim	that	the	subject	has	conclusive	reason	to	act	in	some	way.	Further,	as	Raz has argued, authority is based on the subject's reasons (which go beyond narrow self- 14	Having	the	standing	to	demand	deference from	does	not	entail that	deference is	owed	to the	authority; I deny	the	"directionality	thesis."	See	Andrei	Marmor,	"An	Institutional	Conception	of	Authority,"	Philosophy	& Public	Affairs	39	(2011):	pp.	238-261,	at	pp.	255-60. 6 interest).15	Someone	who	issues	commands	for	her	own	benefit	and	without	consideration of	her	purported	subjects	necessarily	lacks	authority	over	them.	Because	commands	make claims	about subjects' reasons, issuing	a command	establishes	a certain	kind	of "positive ethical	relationship,"	in	Miranda	Fricker's	terms.16	The	ethical	value	present	is	the	value	of one person bending their attention, judgment, and will to the context of another and engaging	the	other	in	the	space	of	her	reasons. Discussions of authority tend to stress the disvalue of authority relationships, especially the subject's presumptive loss of autonomy. This matters for justifying such relationships	but their	positive	value	matters for accurately characterizing	and justifying them as well. Raz rightly points out that as practical reasoners, subjects should often welcome	others'	directives	because	those	directives	help	subjects	conform	better	to	their reasons. Here we go beyond that. Initiating a relationship where one person engages another	in	her	context	and	at	the	level	of	her	reasons	has	value,	as	does	responding	to	such engagement-which	we	will	see	more	clearly	below	in	the	context	of	vulnerability. B.	Hierarchy The	next	noteworthy	characteristic	is	somewhat	obvious	but	important	to	make	explicit:	a relationship of deference is necessarily hierarchical in nature. The hierarchy between authority	and	subject	has	been	implicit	throughout	the	discussion	so	far.	It	includes	the	two complementary elements of superiority and inferiority. When an authority issues a command	to	a	subject,	the	command	signals	that	the	authority	is	in	a	superior	position	and the	subject	is	in	an	inferior	position.	While	the	signal	of	inferiority	is	the	more	worrisome of	the	two,	both	elements	require	explanation. The hierarchy is especially pressing because commands invoke the subject's own reasons.	How can the subject be inferior	with respect to her own reasons?	How can the authority	be	superior	with	respect	to	someone	else's	reasons?	Issuing	a	command	not	only sends	these	signals,	it	gives	them	practical	import	by	demanding	deference	on	the	basis	of the	subject's	inferior	status	in	relation	to	her	own	reasons. There	are	two	distinct	but	related	issues	here.17	The	first	concerns	control	over	one's own actions and responses to reasons: an essential part of self-determination is the standing	to	prioritize	reasons	and	my	responses	to	them.	This	matters	for	which	people	I choose	to	be	friends	with,	my	family	life,	my	choice	of	profession,	and	so	on.	The	other	issue is	about	knowledge	of	my	reasons.	These	are	distinct:	we	might	agree	about	what	reasons	I have	but	disagree	about	who	gets	to	determine	how	I	act	in	response	to	those	reasons. 15	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	pp.	47-48. 16 Fricker, p. 252. The value of such a relationship may be utterly swamped by other considerations in particular	contexts. 17	Thanks	to	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	pushing	me	here. 7 Authorities	claim	superiority	of	both	kinds:	regardless	of	whether	the	subject	thinks she	has	better	judged	the	reasons	that	apply	to	her	and	regardless	of	whether	she	believes she should be the one to determine how to act, the authority claims to override her. Authority	comes	along	with	a	claim	not	only	of	conformity	but	deference:	you	should	not only	act	in	some	way,	you	should	do	so	because	you	were	told	to.	It	is	not	only	the	affront	of other-determination,	it	is	other-determination	on	the	seemingly	paternalistic	grounds	that deference	is	best	on	the	basis	of	the	subject's	own	reasons. Consider the sort of affront that appropriately follows from an unwarranted command.	For	example,	sometimes	strangers	will	approach	cigarette	smokers	on	the	street and	say,	"Stop	smoking!"	A	common	response	is	something	like	"Just	who	do	you	think	you are?"	The	strangers	signal	that	the	smoker	is inferior,	either	lacking	common	information or lacking the standing to decide for herself. This naturally leads to affront. Passing strangers do not stand in the right relationship to be able to order others around and signaling	the	hierarchy	implicit	in	command	is	inappropriate	in	such	circumstances. C.	Vulnerability Deference of any sort makes the deferrer vulnerable to the deferree, meaning that the deferrer's interests can be set back by the deferree's choices. The importance of these interests	and	so	the	degree	of	vulnerability	varies	widely	across	contexts.	A	soldier	obeying a	command	to	fight,	kill,	and	possibly	die	becomes	vulnerable	in	excruciating,	fundamental ways whereas an employee obeying an order to attend a meeting becomes vulnerable much	more	tenuously.	Of	course	we	are	all	vulnerable	to	others	in	a	wide	variety	of	ways. The	vulnerability	of	subject	to	authority	is	of	a	particular	kind. One	way	we	can	be	vulnerable to	others is	when	we	merely	rely	on	them.	Merely relying on someone can be done	without their knowledge and	without any judgment of their character. Kant's neighbors may have relied on his daily walk to schedule their routines.18	They	do	so	based	on	their	assessment	of	his	regularity;	Kant	does	not	know	that they rely on him. Still, they are vulnerable to Kant because their own schedule	may be upset	if	Kant	fails	to	take	his	walk	one	day. The	vulnerability	of	subject	to	authority	is	much	more	robust	than	this.	First,	recall the reflexive intention that is intrinsic to command. Commands depend on mutual knowledge	of	the	relationship	between	authority	and	subject	because	they	depend	on	each party	recognizing	the	authority's	intention	to	bind	in	order	to	succeed.	Unlike	in	the	Kant case, both parties know that the subject is vulnerable to the authority. Further, the authority	demands	that	the	subject	make	herself	vulnerable. Both the mutual recognition of the subject's vulnerability and the demand for 18	For	this	case,	see	Annette	Baier,	"Trust	and	Antitrust,"	Ethics	(1986): pp.	231-260	at	p.	235. 8 vulnerability shape the relationship between authority and subject. Knowledge that someone	else	is	vulnerable	to	you	changes	how	you	should	act.	For	example,	if	Kant	knew that	others	depended	on	the	regularity	of	his	walks,	it	would	be	reasonable	for	him	to	take a	variety	of	new	precautions	to	ensure	regularity.	The	practical	context	of	others	depending on	his	walks	is	different	from	the	context	of	his	walks	just	being	a	personal	part	of	his	daily routine.	If	he	(oddly)	demands	that	they	depend	on	his	walks,	then	he	should	be	especially rigorous	in	his	schedule,	should	inform	them	if	he	will	be	off	schedule,	and	so	on.	Because commands demand vulnerability, they commit the commander to recognizing and accounting for the subject's vulnerability. As Annette Baier, Fricker, and others have emphasized,	we can see this	by considering the appropriate response to failures: if	Kant demands	reliance	and	then	fails	to	keep	his	schedule,	blame	and	feelings	of	betrayal	are	apt, while	they	would	not	be	in	the	unknown	reliance	case. The	fact	that	commands	involve	mutually	recognized	vulnerability	shows	how	much it	matters	that	deferring	to	authority	is	not	just	deference	to	an	abstract	source	of	reasons but	to	another	person.	When	obeying	an	authority,	subjects	rely	on	another's	judgment	and character.19	When you defer to a command, you depend on the authority in a variety of ways: you depend on their judgment regarding your reasons, on their ability and willingness to act for those reasons, on their commitment to your autonomy and to the importance of not commanding unless necessary, and perhaps most importantly you depend	on	their	understanding	of	your	vulnerability	and	their	unwillingness	to	exploit	that vulnerability. Deferring to others creates a space where they can harm you at their discretion,	so	involves	depending	on	their	conscientiousness,	honesty,	insight,	and	care. This	all	means that the	vulnerability	of	subject to	authority is	especially	relational and	personal:	when	one	person	defers to	another "a	deal	of trust is struck."20	Such	deals matter:	relations	of	trust	enable	and	partially	constitute	some	of	the	most	valuable	aspects of our lives.	When the	deal is struck, the subject signals that the authority is sufficiently trustworthy	to	defer	to,	makes	herself	vulnerable	to	the	authority,	the	authority	accepts	the vulnerability	that	was	demanded,	and	signals	that	the	subject	was	correct	to	defer.21	This	is why betrayal is an apt response to the abuse and	misuse of authority. By deferring the subject	created	a	space	where	she	could	be	harmed	by	the	authority,	the	authority	accepted the subject's deference in full knowledge of that space, and in the end the subject was harmed.	The	deal	of	trust	was	broken. 19	Cf.	John	Hardwig,	"The	Role	of	Trust	in	Knowledge,"	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	88	(1991):	pp. 693-708	at	p. 700. 20	Fricker,	p.	257.	Cf.	Joseph	Raz,	"Government	by	Consent,"	in	Ethics	and	the	Public	Domain	(Oxford:	Oxford University	Press,	1995):	pp.	355-369	at	p.	367. 21	The	authority	is	also	made	vulnerable	to	the	subject,	albeit	in	a	notably	weaker	way,	because	her	reputation is	on	the	line,	her	standing	as	a	commander	and	her	trustworthiness	are	put	to	the	test,	and	so	on. 9 D.	Appropriateness Finally,	the	command's	demand	for	deference	signals	that	the	deference	is	appropriate.	One way of bringing out the strength of this signal is to contrast it	with the testimony case: testimony	is	an	invitation	to	trust	the	testifier.	The	ultimate	goal	is	for	that	invitation	to	be accepted,	but	it	is	still	just	an	invitation,	so	is	open	for	the	recipient	to	accept	or	reject.	This is akin to advice in the	practical case.	When I advise you to act in some	way, I certainly signal that I think this is the	appropriate	way to	act,	but I am	still simply inviting	you to accept	my	advice.	The	ultimate	standard	of	appropriateness	is	your	own. Commands are different because they demand deference. Not only do commands signal	that	deference	is	appropriate,	they	specifically	signal	that	the	appropriateness	holds regardless	of	whether the subject agrees	with that assessment.	Commands	do	not invite, commands	impose.	If	a	subordinate	soldier	questions	whether	a	command	is	appropriate, the commander's judgment of appropriateness simply overrides the subordinate's.22 Further,	the	command	is	a	content-independent	reason,	so	the	appropriateness	is	based	on the	qualities	of	the	commander	rather	than	on	the	quality	of	the	content	of	the	command. Commands	signal	that	all	the	distinctive	aspects	of	the	relationship	of	authority	are appropriate: that the subject really does have conclusive reason to act in the way commanded, that they should defer and thereby make themselves vulnerable, that the subject is an inferior position, that the authority is in a superior position and has the standing	to	accept	the	subject's	vulnerability,	that	the	deal	of	trust	should	be	struck,	and	so on. The most important implication of this signal is that the commander thereby takes responsibility	for	the	appropriateness	of	the	relationship	and	its	results. It is the commander who	makes the initial demand and signals appropriateness, taking the	weight and implications of the relationship onto	herself.	When I demand that you	do	as	I	say,	I	put	you	on	a	path	that	you	otherwise	might	not	have	embarked	on	and	I rule	out	all	other	paths.	In	an	important	sense	you	have	become	an	extension	of	my	will	and my understanding of how the world should be. I become responsible for your actions because	I	impose	the	relationship	that	led	to	your	actions	in	the	first	place.	This	contrasts with the case of advice, where you might blame me for bad advice, but the ultimate responsibility is with you for accepting and acting on my advice in light of your own judgment	of	its	quality. Our	practices	of	authority reflect the fact that	authorities	accept responsibility for their subjects' actions and the consequences of their commands.23	Military commanders are blamed for their units' failures and praised for successes, coaches are credited	with their teams'	wins,	and	so	on.	This is	because their subordinates	and	players	are	carrying out the	will of the commander by obeying the commander's directives. The commander 22	On	the	necessary	limitations	of	this	claim,	see	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	p.	62. 23	Responsibility	is	not	zero-sum,	so	this	doesn't	entail	that	deference	makes	subjects	less	responsible. 10 signaled	the	appropriateness	of	their	subjects	deferring	and	acting	in	the	way	commanded, so	takes	responsibility	for	their	deference	and	its	results.	This	goes	overlooked	if	we	focus on	the	rationality	of	subjects'	deference	rather	than	on	the	mutual	relationship	that	obtains when	a	command	is	issued. III.	Four	Conditions The relational analysis demonstrates that the act of demanding deference from another person establishes a relationship of hierarchy, vulnerability, and responsibility. These elements are built into the nature of authority: authority is the power to command and commanding initiates and depends upon this kind of relationship. The relational conception	of	authority,	then,	asks	under	what	conditions	such	a	relationship	is	justified.	In this section I argue for four individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on authority	by	showing	that	the	authority	relationship	is	objectionable	in	the	absence	of	each. A.	Duty Issuing a command signals that the subject is inferior specifically with respect to their reasons. Further, the signal is that they are so inferior that they should defer to the authority's judgment just because the authority said so. How could such a signal be appropriate?	What	would	explain	standing	is	such	a	relation	to	another	person? The	most	significant	obstacles	to	such	relations	are	our	rights	to	autonomy	and	selfdetermination,	which	entail that	we	generally	have the	right to	choose	how	to	act	within specific	bounds.	We	get	to	choose	how	to	live	our	lives	without	interference,	including	how to	balance	and	prioritize	our reasons, so	we	are	aptly affronted	when	others arrogate to themselves	the	power	to	unilaterally	interfere	in	such	choices.	Since	we	have	a	right	to	selfdetermination	ceteris	paribus, the	relationship	of	authority	does	not	usually	obtain.	There needs to be some morally weighty consideration that could defeat that right to selfdetermination.	This	brings	me	to	the	first	condition	on	genuine	authority: the	duty	condition:	a	person	can	have	authority	over	another	only	when	the potential	subject	is	under	a	preexisting	duty,	the	fulfillment	of	which	defeats standing	rights	to	self-determination. The	latter	clause	recognizes	the	possibility	that	it's	not	the	case	that	any	duty	whatsoever could ground authority. Some moral duties are relatively minor and some can only be fulfilled by self-direction; such duties will not defeat the standing right to selfdetermination. Imagine	that	the	duty	condition	is	not	met.	If	the	subject	is	not	under	a	duty	to	act (or	not	under	a	sufficiently	stringent	duty),	then	her	right	to	self-determination	holds	sway 11 and	she	should	be	able	to	choose	how	to live	her life for	herself. In	general, if there is	no preexisting	duty,	then	there	is	nothing	important	enough	to	justify	another	person	being	in the position to demand that she act in any specific way, so nobody can have genuine authority	over	her.	Equality	defines	our	default	relationships	with	others;	the	relationship of	deference	and	hierarchy	demands	special	justification. This	results	in	a	picture	of	authority	according	to	which	someone	only	has	authority for the purpose of others meeting their preexisting duties. In this way it is clearly instrumentalist: authority's purpose or role is to help subjects fulfill their duties (and correlatively	respect	others'	rights).24	That	said,	the	instrumentalist	role	of	authority	on	the relational	conception	is	significantly	more	limited	than	on	Raz's	service	conception,	where authority helps subjects conform better to reason generally. Practical reasons are ubiquitous for rational agents like ourselves, and so the service conception appears to license	ubiquitous	authority	as	well;	but	authority	does	not	seem	to	extend	in	the	ways	this implies.	This is the foundation	of	many	objections to the	service	conception, for	example grounding	worries	that	we	will	be	subject	to	the	authority	of	reliable	computers,	personal trainers, cooking instructors, financial advisors, and perhaps even anyone slightly	wiser than	us.25 Raz does importantly limit the scope of authority with what he calls the independence condition, according to	which authority only obtains	when "it is better to conform	to reason than to	decide for	oneself."26	While	Raz	argues that the independence condition is an important constraint on authority, he is still concerned	with the broader question of responding	well to reasons and does not claim authority is limited to dutyfulfillment.	He	revealingly	writes,	"the	desirability	of	deciding	for	oneself,	independently	of authority,	is	a	major	enhancer	and	qualifier	of	the	scope	of	authority."27 In contrast, on	my view authority concerns	when one has the right to decide for oneself,	not	when	deciding	for	oneself	is	merely	desirable.	Raz	mentions	a	case	where	you are unsure of your own judgment and so looking to another for guidance is desirable. According	to	the	service	conception	a	subject	may	well	be	under	genuine	authority	in	such cases, but	not according to the relational conception. It	may	be	desirable to let someone 24	This	doesn't	entail	that	the	purpose	of	authority	is	to	maximize	duty-fulfillment. 25	See	Perry,	pp.	47,	49;	Shapiro,	pp.	417,	423;	Darwall,	"Authority	and	Second-Personal	Reasons	for	Acting," pp. 147-148; Stephen Darwall, "Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal," Ethics 120 (2010):	pp.	257-278	at	p.	258;	Kenneth	Einar	Himma,	"Just	'Cause	You're	Smarter	than	Me	Doesn't	Give	You	a Right	to	Tell	Me	What	to	Do:	Legitimate	Authority	and	the	Normal	Justification	Thesis,"	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal Studies	27	(2007):	pp.	121-150. 26 Joseph Raz, "The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception",	Minnesota Law Review 90 (2006):	pp.	1003-1044	at	p.	1014;	also	see	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	p.	69. 27	Joseph	Raz,	"Comments	and	Responses,"	in	Lukas	H.	Meyer,	Stanley	L.	Paulson,	and	Thomas	W.	Pogge	(eds.) Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University	Press,	2003):	pp.	253-273,	at	p.	261. 12 else	decide,	and	rational	to	do	so,	but	on	my	view	you	cannot	be	under	authority	because you are not under any preexisting duty-which is why personal trainers and cooking instructors	lack	practical	authority.	The	rationality	or	desirability	of	deferring	to	someone is	distinct	from	whether	they	have	the	power	to	demand	deference	from	you.28 Similar	thoughts	about	desirability	and	rights	apply	in	other	contexts.	Your	property rights	constrain	others'	actions	even	when	it	is	desirable	or	somehow	rational	to	let	them act.	It	might	be	desirable	to	let	an	interior	designer	into	your	home	to	decorate,	yet	they	are only permitted to do so if you allow it. The desirability is distinct from the question of whether	they	have	the	standing	to	unilaterally	do	what	is	desirable. Two further clarifications: first, as part of my attempt to provide a relatively ecumenical theory	of	practical	authority, I leave	open the	particular	account	of	duty.	The relational conception shows what considerations must be balanced to understand authority,	but	many	comprehensive	value	theories	could	employ	it.	Plausibly	what	matters is	that	there	can	only	be	genuine	authority	when	some	significantly	important	interests	of others	are	at stake,	which	ground	very	weighty,	presumptively	binding reasons for	us to respect	those	interests.	Only	duties	could	override	the	significant	interests	we	have	in	selfdetermination,	which ground	our standing immunity against others	having the	power to command	us. Our	final	view	about	the	scope	and	shape	of	genuine	authority	will	in	large	part	be determined by our view about the relevant duties, including how stringent they are, to what	extent	we	owe	positive	duties	of	aid	to	others,	and	so	on.	Included	in	this	will	be	our understanding of autonomy or self-determination and its importance relative to other grounds	of	duties.	This	affects	the	latter	clause	of	the	duty	condition;	the	more	important you	think	autonomy	is,	the	fewer	duties	will	be	sufficiently	important	to	override	it.	Robert Paul	Wolff's anarchist argument could be interpreted as the end point of this spectrum, according	to	which	deference	is	conceptually	heteronomous.29 Second, the duty condition is quite flexible. Below I use the example of an emergency	duty	of	aid	but	many	other	relevant	kinds	of	duties	have	significantly	different implications for authority. Two interesting examples: first, a Rawlsian natural duty of justice	to	establish	and	maintain	the	basic	structure	of	society	is	a	life-long	and	pervasive duty	that	has	drastic	implications	for	the	possibility	of	genuine	political	authority.30	This	is not	like	a	temporary	duty	of	aid,	but	a	duty	that	may	justify	intergenerational	institutions	of authority.	Second,	the	duty	condition	can	be	met	by	a	duty	created	with	an	act	of	consent. This	is	particularly	relevant	for	many	of	the	practices	of	authority	in	our	daily	lives	that	are based	on	contracts, like	those	in	an	employment	context.	Consent	is	a	somewhat	artificial way	to	fulfill	the	duty	condition:	insofar	as	your	employer	has	authority,	it	is	not	based	on 28	Cf.	Perry,	p.	42	and	A.	John	Simmons,	Boundaries	of	Authority	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016),	p.	26. 29	Robert	Paul	Wolff,	In	Defense	of	Anarchism	(New	York:	Harper	&	Row,	1970). 30	John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	rev.	ed.	(Cambridge:	Harvard	UP,	1999),	pp.	293-94. 13 some	separate	duty	(e.g.	a	duty	to	be	maximally	productive)	but	on	the	duty	you	create	to abide	by	the	terms	you	consented	to. B.	Precedence So the subject has a particularly important kind of duty, the sort that could potentially justify	deference.	Call it the "grounding"	duty.	The	grounding	duty	only	captures the first step	in	the	possibility	of	justified	deference	and	the	hierarchy	that	such	deference	entails.	It does not yet explain why the subject is inferior with respect to these reasons in this particular case or why the authority is superior. The duty condition establishes that deference	may	be	required	in	a	particular	class	of	cases	but	we	still	need	to	explain	why	the subject	should	defer	to	a	specific	other	person.	This	leads	us	to	our	second	condition: the precedence condition: a person can have authority over another only when the potential subject is more likely to fulfill her grounding duty by following the potential authority's commands than by following her own judgment. When the authority's commands are likely superior for the relevant purposes, her commands	take	precedence	over	the	subject's	judgment.	(This	essentially	amounts	to	Raz's normal	justification	thesis.)	A	variety	of	considerations	can	fulfill	the	precedence	condition, including	expertise,	perspective,	and	coordination. Consider	the	following	case:	hiking	with	your	doctor	friend	in	the	forest	far	beyond the range	of	phone service	or friendly	outposts, you	discover some	critically injured	and unconscious hikers. The	motivating idea behind the precedence condition is that as you assist the hikers you should defer to your friend because her medical judgment is so superior	to	yours,	given	her	expertise	(without	considering	yet	whether	she	has	authority). Not	only	should	you	defer,	it	is	appropriate	for	her	to	signal	the	superiority	of	her	judgment and	the	relative	inferiority	of	your	judgment.	You	have	an	urgent	task	to	perform	and	this	is not	the	time	for	a	friendly	debate	about	the	relative	merits	of	various	medical	treatments, especially	not	between	expert	and	novice. Imagine that the	precedence	condition is	not	met, as	when	your	hiking friend is	a medical	novice	like	you.	In	that	case	it	would	be	odd	to	think	that	you	should	defer	to	them precisely because following their commands is no more likely to help the hikers than following	your	own judgment is.	You	still	need to coordinate	but	neither	of	you is in the place	to	initiate	a	relationship	of	authority:	to	demand	deference	from	the	other,	to	signal superiority	and	inferiority,	and	to	take	the	weight	of	the	hikers'	lives	on	your	will. Authority	in	an	emergency	is	quite	different	from	other	kinds	of	authority.	Political authority, for example, is generally claimed over wide swaths of activities and over the entire	course	of	subjects' lives.	The	precedence	condition	will	be	much	harder	to	meet in 14 such cases, wherein commands signal a much more wide-ranging and fundamental relationship of hierarchy and have significant implications for subjects' standing as selfdetermining persons. But this is what we should expect. The broader the scope of an authority's	jurisdiction,	the	less	room	for	subjects	to	choose	for	themselves,	so	the	heavier the	justificatory	burden. C.	Acceptance The duty and precedence conditions account for appropriate hierarchical signals in the space	of	reasons.	The	final	two	conditions	capture	the	crucial	aspect	of	mutually	recognized and unilaterally demanded vulnerability. We first focus on the standing to demand vulnerability. Recall the deal of trust: authorities are aware that they demand deference and vulnerability from subjects, subjects recognize that demand, and subjects accede to the demand specifically on the word of the authority. In order for this to be justified, the authority	must	recognize	and	respect	the	subject's	vulnerability	and	the	expression	of	trust that	deference	entails.	The	authority	recognizes	the	trust	put	in	her	and	recognizes	the	fact that	she	signaled	the	appropriateness	of	that	trust in	the	first	place.	For	all these	reasons the authority	must account for the relationship of vulnerability in her actions by taking responsibility for the command and its consequences, including but not limited to the consequences	on	the	subject	herself.	From	this	we	get	the	third	condition: the acceptance condition: a person can have authority over another only when	the	potential	authority	understands	and	accepts	that	she	has	authority and	the	accompanying	responsibility	of	command. I	lack	authority	over	you	if	I	do	not	appreciate	the	gravity	of	issuing	commands	to	you	and expecting	you	to	carry	out	my	will	in	the	world.	In	that	case	I	do	not	have	the	standing	to demand	deference	from	you	and	you	are	not	subject	to	my	will	(even	if	you	have	reason	to defer	to	me). Imagine that the acceptance condition is not met. Genuine authority without the acceptance	condition	would	entail	that	one	person	could	justifiably	demand	deference	and vulnerability from	another	without	any	recognition	of the	costs	of	her	commands for	her subjects or the gravity of the relationship she is initiating. She	would	not appreciate the trust put in her and would not take account of the subject's vulnerability in her deliberations	about	how	to	exercise,	and	not	exercise,	her	authority.	In	not	understanding the costs of deferring to an authority, she also does not understand the risks of abusing authority by making inappropriate demands. The idea that she could have genuine authority	in	such	conditions	undercuts	the	instrumentalist	role	of	authority	and	contradicts our practices of authority,	wherein authorities take responsibility for their role and can 15 lose	their	authority	when	they	act	irresponsibly. The acceptance condition is one of the	most distinctive elements of the relational conception.	Discussions	of	authority	generally	focus	on	the	conflict	between	autonomy	and authority, which is a conflict for subjects. As such the role of the authority has been comparatively ignored.	What the relational analysis shows is that subjects defer in large part because of authorities' commitments and signals that accompany any command, importantly including the authority's commitment to accept responsibility for the relationship.31 A social practice of authority that relied on subjects responding to an authority's implicit acceptance of responsibility but did not require the authority to actually	accept	responsibility	would	be	unreasonable. Two notable results: first, someone who was otherwise well placed to be an authority might lack authority because she refuses to take responsibility. Second, the acceptance	condition	emphasizes	that	authorities	need	some	understanding	of	the	nature of command. In the injured	hikers	case the	potential	authority	at stake is	very limited in both	scope	and	time	and	your	doctor	friend	presumably	recognizes	the	impermissibility	of demanding	deference from	you in	normal	contexts.	But in	other	cases,	again	highlighting the political case	where governments not only claim vast authority but set the limits of their	own	authority	and	coercively	enforce	it, it is incredibly	important	that	governments understand the	nature	of	authority	and its costs.	Agents that	do	not recognize	what is	at stake	in	a	relationship	of	authority	cannot	stand	in	such	a	relationship	over	others	and	so lack	genuine	authority. This is true even if it would be good or required for subjects to defer to their directives on other grounds and so the first two conditions were met. For example, a government that does not recognize its responsibilities to citizens in issuing commands lacks political authority. Citizens	may still be required to conform to particular laws, for example	following	guidelines	on	the	storage	of	industrial	chemicals,	but	this	requirement	is grounding in the fact that the law is a good guide to	what counts as sufficiently secure storage,	not	because	the	government	can	appropriately	demand	deference.	As	emphasized above,	the	requirement	and	the	standing	to	impose	the	requirement	are	distinct. There is a worry here, however. It may seem that, rather than a condition on genuine authority, the acceptance condition describes something extraneous, such as a duty of care or virtuous command.32	However,	many relationships-and the powers and claims	conferred	by	being	in	such	relationships-are	contingent	on	the	acknowledgement and	acceptance	of	various	rights	and	responsibilities.	The	powers that	parents	have	over their	children	are in	part	contingent	on	accepting	a	duty	of	care; if the	parent	abuses	the child	and	so	egregiously	fails	the	duty	of	care,	they	lose	the	powers	of	parenting.	We	think such	powers	are	contingent	on	accepting	the	duty	of	care	due	to	the	interests	of	the	child, 31	Cf.	Scanlon,	p.	307. 32	Thanks	to	three	anonymous	reviewers	for	raising	this	issue. 16 the	nature	of	the	relationship,	and	how	we	understand	the	social	practice	of	parenting.	The same is true of authority. Possessing the power to demand deference is contingent on accepting	the	responsibilities	of	command	because	deference	requires	that	subjects	make themselves	vulnerable. In both the authority and parenting cases, the	minimal responsibility upon	which possession	of	the	power	is	contingent	is	also	clearly	distinct	from	the	standards	defining	a virtuous	relationship.	A	virtuous	parent	goes	far	beyond	refraining	from	neglect	or	abuse and a virtuous authority would go beyond refraining from abusing her authority. The acceptance condition marks out a minimal prerequisite for possession of authority, not anything	more	robust. D.	Trustworthiness Deferring	to	an	authority	makes	the	subject	vulnerable	to	the	authority	in	the	specific	sense that	the	subject	takes	the	mere	fact	of	the	authority's	say-so	as	a	binding	reason	to	act,	so the	subject's	interests	may	be	set	back	by	the	authority	choosing	to	direct	the	subject	in	one way	rather	than	another.	Deference	involves	entrusting	one's	interests	to	another.	In	order for such an act to be justified, the person gaining control over the interests must be sufficiently trustworthy, given the importance of the interests at stake. According to the analysis of trustworthiness that I follow, someone is trustworthy if they are sufficiently competent	and	are	sufficiently	committed	to	acting	for	the	right	reasons.33 Imagine	you	are	planning to	entrust	your infant to	a	babysitter.	You should	do so only	if	the	babysitter	is	sufficiently	competent	and	sufficiently	committed	to	securing	your child's	welfare. Lacking either	makes them	untrustworthy and so	makes entrusting your infant	to	their	care	inappropriate.	If	you	have	a	sibling	who	is	absolutely	committed	to	your child's welfare but is absolutely incompetent with respect to infant care, then they are untrustworthy as a babysitter. Similarly, a skilled babysitter who was your enemy and wished your child harm	would not be sufficiently trustworthy. In both cases entrusting your	child's	welfare	to	them	is	unjustified	because	you	should	not	make	yourself	and	your child vulnerable to their decisions given their untrustworthiness: if you give them the discretionary control that entrusting entails, they are likely to set back your child's interests,	perhaps	disastrously. Deference	requires	trustworthiness	because	deference	entails	entrusting	important interests	to	another	and	to	their	choices,	opening	a	space	where	they	can	harm	you	at	their discretion.	This	directs	us	to	the	fourth	condition: the	trustworthiness	condition:	a	person	can	have	authority	over	another	only 33	This	is	a	modified	version	of	Baier's	account	of	trust.	See	Fricker,	pp.	256-7	for	the	modification. 17 when the potential authority is sufficiently trustworthy relative to how vulnerable	the	potential	subject	would	become	by	deferring. The competence component of trustworthiness is relatively straightforward.34 The commitment component of trustworthiness is more distinctive. Even if someone is supremely	competent	and	understands	the	role	of	authorities,	if	she	lacks	a	commitment	to the	right	reasons	then	she	can	undermine	and	otherwise	set	back	your	interests	in	a	variety of	ways.35 Consider	the	injured	hikers	case	with	the	modification	that	your	hiking	partner	is	a doctor primarily interested in studying hiking injuries. The doctor is committed to the wrong reasons, to research rather than assistance, so you should not defer to their commands. Even if the doctor claims they are assisting, their commitment to the	wrong reasons gives you sufficient grounds to reject their	demand for	deference.	The	most you should	do	is	examine	the	plausibility	of	their	imperatives	with	your	own	judgment,	keeping a	wary	eye	out	for	misleading	directives.	In	that	case	you	would	not	be	deferring	to	them	as a genuine authority but	merely gleaning information from them as a potentially reliable guide	to	your	reasons. Imagine that the trustworthiness condition is	not	met.	Then the subject	would	be under the control of someone who is likely to abuse their power, whether due to incompetence,	to	ill-will,	or	to	commitment	to	the	wrong	reasons.	In	any	of	these	cases	the purpose and role of authority would again be stymied. We would be unreasonably requiring	people	to	make	themselves	vulnerable	in	cases	where	such	vulnerability	is	both risky	and	ineffective. We	now	have	the	entire	relational	conception	of	authority	before	us.	When	the	four conditions are met, the appropriateness of the relationship between authorities and subjects	can	be	explained	and	the	various	signals	and	commitments	that	commands	involve can be justified. In such circumstances, one person has genuine practical authority over another because the subject is under a duty, the authority's commands take precedence over	the	subject's judgment in the fulfillment	of that	duty, the	authority	understands	and accepts the	accompanying	responsibility,	and the	authority is sufficiently trustworthy for the	subject	to	make	herself	vulnerable	by	deferring	to	the	authority's	will. Consider	the	original	hikers	case.	As	seems	clearly	correct	to	me,	your	doctor	friend has	genuine	authority	over	you	because	1)	you	have	a	duty	to	medically	aid	the	hikers,	2) 34	Competence	goes	beyond	the	precedence	condition	because	it	includes	elements	about	the	actual	activity	of issuing commands to achieve certain ends. If someone could not make the content of their commands comprehensible,	for	example,	they	would	be	incompetent,	even	if	their	judgment	in	that	domain	was	superb. 35	Two	sets	of	reasons	are	relevant: the	subject's	reasons	regarding fulfillment	of	her	grounding	duties	and the authority's reasons regarding the possession and exercise of a power. The precedence and trustworthiness	conditions	concern	the	former,	while	the	acceptance	condition	concerns	the	latter. 18 she is	an	expert	on	the	medical	reasons,	3)	she	accepts	responsibility for	your	deference, and	4)	she is sufficiently trustworthy.	The thought is	very	simple:	you	must	do	what	she says	regardless	of	your	judgment	on	the	matter	because	people's	lives	are	at	stake	and	she is a well-meaning doctor. Medical doctors have practical authority over laypeople in medical	emergencies	ceteris	paribus. Returning to the concept of authority, we can see how the conditions relate to preemption	and	content-independence.	The	duty	and	precedence	conditions	help	explain preemption: the authority's command takes on the force of the grounding duty and so preempts reasons in conflict with that duty, while it preempts the subject's alternative possible avenues for fulfilling that duty due to the command taking precedence. The acceptance and trustworthiness conditions help explain content-independence: the subject's	reason	to	obey is	based	on	the	authority's	commitment	to	the	subject's	reasons, acceptance of the responsibility of command, and trustworthiness. It is features of the speaker and	not the content of the speech act that explain	how the command	binds and why	the	subject	should	defer. IV.	Assessing	the	Relational	Conception The	advantages	of	the	relational	conception	of	authority	are	best	seen	in	comparison	to	the service conception.	While the	main differences rest in the	way the relational conception treats the authority, and so in the acceptance and trustworthiness conditions, the duty condition matters as well. We can see all three at work in the case of consent-based authority. Raz denies that consent can ground genuine authority without the service conception being met otherwise; consent is only an "auxiliary" or "secondary" consideration on his view.36 This is puzzling in the context of contemporary political philosophy,	where	consent	is	widely	considered	the	ideal	ground	of	genuine	authority. Raz's dismissal of consent is a direct result, though, of his focus on the general question	of	the	rationality	and	desirability	of	deference.	Consent	makes	little	difference	to these	questions.	You	should	only	consent	to	defer	where	there	are	already	weighty	reasons indicating	that	deference is	rational	or	desirable,	so it is	already	the	case	that the	service conception applies. By contrast, focusing on	who has the right to decide, as in the duty condition,	is	quite	different.	Because	consent	can	create	a	duty	where	none	existed,	consent can	create	the	context	for	the	duty	condition	to	be	fulfilled	where	it	would	not	otherwise. On	the	relational	conception	consent	can	independently	ground	authority. The acceptance and trustworthiness conditions mark the limits of consensual authority.	You	can	consent	to	make	someone	an	authority	over	you	where	such	consent	is imprudent.	But if they ignore the limits	of authority, for	example	by	commanding	you to 36	Raz,	"Government	by	Consent"	and	The	Morality	of	Freedom,	p.	93. 19 commit murder or suicide, they fail the acceptance and trustworthiness conditions. Although	consent	makes	these	conditions	less	stringent	because	they	are	in	part	based	in the reasons that you waived when you consented to obey, they do not fall out of the analysis. Reasons that you did not and could not	waive, such as those regarding others' right	to	live,	still	constrain	the	authority	and	determine	whether	she	counts	as	committing to	and	responding	to	the	right	set	of	reasons.	In	sum,	Raz's	mishandling	of	consent-based authority arises from his strict focus on how the subject should respond to reasons. By taking a more complete view, the relational conception not only accommodates but illuminates	the	possibility	of	consent-based	authority. I	have	gestured	at	this	comparison	to	Raz	throughout	my	discussion,	but	now	I	can state	it	clearly.	Raz	analyzes	authority	through	the	frame	of	the	subject's	problems,	i.e.	the rationality	of	deference	and	its	compatibility	with	autonomy.	This	narrow	frame	results	in the	service	conception's	thin	set	of	normative	conditions	on	authority,	which	in	turn	makes authority	too	easy	to	achieve	and	so	finds	authority	in	many	places	where	there	is	merely good reason to use an outside source for guidance in making decisions. I began with a wider frame by inquiring into the relationship that obtains when one person demands practical	deference from	another.	This	encompasses the	subject's	problems	but	adds two important	general	elements.	First,	the	authority	has	her	own	set	of	problems	because	she	is demanding another person make themselves vulnerable to her and so must accept the weighty responsibility of command. Second, the subject's position is shaped by her vulnerability as	much	as	by the	desirability	of	deference;	her reason to	defer is	based in significant	part	on	the	authority's	signal	that	the	demand	for	deference	is	appropriate	and on	the	accompanying	signals	of	responsibility	and	trustworthiness.	These	general	elements led us to the four conditions on authority, which both amend and extend the service conception.	Authority	does	not	appear	whenever	it	is	more	desirable	to	defer	to	another;	it is	constrained	to	circumstances	where	one	person	stands	in	the	appropriate	relationship	to demand	deference	from	another. Finally,	while	the	relational	analysis	focuses	on	interpersonal	features	of	authority,	I intend the relational conception to capture all kinds of practical authority, importantly including political authority. A potential objection rests precisely in this individual orientation:	authority	is	most	often	institutional	in	our	world	and	it	is	unclear	whether	the relational	conception	explains	authority	in	that	context. There	are	two	worries	here.	First,	it	may	appear	as	if	I	am	claiming	that	institutional authority rests on the characteristics of individuals: on whether individuals within the institution	are	sufficiently	trustworthy,	accept	the	responsibilities	of	command,	and	so	on. But this is implausible because, first, institutions can mask or change individual characteristics.	More	fundamentally,	as	Scott	Shapiro	argues,	"Because	the	legitimacy	of	an official's authority is impersonal, dependent as it is on the legitimacy of the office, the 20 personal qualities of any official can contribute nothing to the legitimacy of the official's authority."37 Nothing I argued above commits	me to the view that institutional authority	must rest in the characteristics	of individuals.	The relational conception takes the institutional whole as its evaluand because that is	where institutional authority ultimately rests. The authority	of	any	given	official	is	best	understood	as	delegated	from	the	institutional	whole. My conditions on authority regard possession, not necessarily delegation. For example, trustworthiness	is	necessary	for	genuine	authority	but	a	particular	bureaucrat	need	not	be individually and personally trustworthy for her to have the authority conferred by her office.	Rather,	the	whole	system	from	which	she	received	her	delegated	authority	must	be sufficiently	trustworthy	(including	the	rules	that	regulate	delegation	and	ensure	individual office-holders do not abuse their positions). The picture is	more complex at the level of institutions	but	the	same	conditions	hold.38 This raises the second worry: what features of the institutional whole do we evaluate	when	applying	the	conditions?	Consider	trustworthiness	again,	analyzed	in	terms of	competence	and	commitment	to	the	right	reasons. Individual	trustworthiness	is	usually assessed	via	character	traits:	"She's	a	reliable	person,	with	a	good	heart."	It's	not	clear	what it	means	for	an	institution	to	be	trustworthy	in	the	same	way	since	institutions	seem	not	to have	character	traits	in	the	same	way	that	individuals	do. However,	we	commonly	ascribe	similar	character	traits	to	institutions,	understood mainly	through	the	lens	of	institutional	design.	Competence	should	be	fairly	clear;	we	need to assess institutional competence to apply the service conception as well. When the Environmental Protection	Agency employs scientific experts, institutional design enables that expertise to shape its	directives.	We	can tell a complicated story	about	how	various scientists, administrators, and so on are employed by the agency and form a cohesive whole through institutional rules and norms. This would explain how under the right conditions the institution's directives can constitute sufficiently competent, even expert, directives. Commitment to the right reasons can similarly be constituted by institutional accountability mechanisms rather than by personal beliefs or virtues. In the case of political institutions, constitutions set out	what sorts of reasons the government can act upon	and	which	it	can't.	They	set	constraints	on	the	exercise	of	political	power,	for	example through	a	bill	of	rights.	Effective institutional	design	and	healthy institutional	culture	can partially	constitute	commitment	to	the	right	reasons. 37	Shapiro,	p.	401. 38	Any theory	of authority	will need to	make this general	move	because commands conceptually require a specific	intention	yet	an	official	within	an	institution	may	unintentionally	exercise	authority,	e.g.	accidentally stamping an order. The relevant intentionality	must exist at the level of the institution as determined by institutional	rules,	not	by	individual	office-holder	mental	states. 21 Related thoughts show how to apply the acceptance condition. Governments recognize the	weight	of their responsibility	and the	difficulty	of	exercising	authority	well and	so	take	strides	to	make	their	reasons	explicit,	their	self-acknowledged	responsibilities clear,	and	their	accountability	mechanisms	strong	and	public.	They	do	this	in	part	through institutional	design-constitutions, the separation	of	powers, checks and	balances, etc.- but also through norms of transparency, public justifications, and so on. Note that the responsibility	of	political	authorities	is	extremely	weighty, largely	because	failures	can	be so	disastrous,	so	what	it	means	to	sufficiently	understand	and	accept	the	responsibility	of command will be much more demanding than in cases like the emergency authority described above. However, the general idea that plausible claimants to genuine political authority	must	meet	stringent	demands	of	this	sort	in	their	institutional	design	and	culture is already widely accepted. The relational conception helps explain why we think governments	that	lack	these	features	cannot	have	genuine	political	authority. In	conclusion,	practical	authority	exists	to	help	people	better	fulfill	their	duties	and meet	people's	claims.	To	have	authority,	though,	is	to	have	the	power	to	demand	practical deference from others, and this power is worrying both to wield and to be subject to. Analyzing the relationship that obtains when such a power is exercised led me to the relational conception of authority. Only if the duty, precedence, acceptance, and trustworthiness conditions are jointly met does one person have genuine practical authority	over	another.